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THE STRONG ARM OF CERCLA: EPA ALLOWED FREE REIGN
TO RECOUP CLEANUP COSTS
United States v. W R. Grace & Co.1
I. INTRODUCTION
The judgment requiring W.R. Grace to pay $54.5 million dollars
for the cleanup of asbestos in Libby, Montana is the largest award in the
history of the federal Superfund law.2 The Ninth Circuit's decision allows
the Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA") to classify a cleanup
without regard to the requirements set forth in the Comprehensive
Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act ("CERCLA").
Under CERCLA, the EPA must classify a cleanup as either a removal or
remedial action. A removal action is short term, while a remedial action is
continuous. The classification of the action as either removal or remedial
determines the procedures the EPA has to follow during cleanup.
This case note argues that the Ninth Circuit's decision allows the
EPA to exercise too much authority and grants the EPA the power to
classify any action as a removal. Thus, the EPA can now ignore the
procedural safeguards that were once required for remedial actions and
still require the party to bear the financial burden of the cleanup. By
leaving the classification to the EPA, the court effectively removes itself
from the picture and shuts off review of further challenges to the EPA's
classification of cleanup actions under CERCLA.
II. FACTS AND HOLDING
In the late 1800's, vermiculite ore was discovered in the
mountainous regions located near Libby, Montana. 3 Vermiculite ore
contains a mineral called tremolite, which is a form of asbestos.4 In 1939,
' 429 F.3d 1224 (9th Cir. 2005) [hereinafter Grace II].
2 9th Cir. Upholds $54.5 Million Order for Libby, Mont. Cleanup Costs, 28 No. 4
Andrews Asbestos Litig. Rep. 6 (December 16, 2005).
3 United States v. W.R. Grace & Co.-Conn. (Grace 1), 280 F. Supp. 2d 1135, 1138 (D.
Mont. 2002).
4id
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the Zonolite Company began to mine and process the vermiculite.' The
Zonolite Company then processed the vermiculite into products and
insulating materials which in turn contained asbestos.6 The Zonolite
Company was bought by W.R. Grace ("Grace") in 1963. Grace continued
the mining and processing operations in Libby until 1990.8
During Grace's operation of the plant, materials containing
asbestos were transported to both the processing mill and the distribution
centers.9 The materials containing asbestos ended up in the homes of
Grace's employees because Grace allowed the employees to use its
products to insulate their homes and to condition the soil in their
gardens.' 0 Grace also donated the asbestos containing products to local
schools." The schools used the material in tracks and baseball fields.12
Although Grace began its mining operation around 1960, the full
extent of the problem facing Libby did not surface until the late nineties.' 3
In 1999, the EPA was called to Libby to address health issues related to
asbestos contamination. 14 The EPA conducted a study from November
1999 to January 2000.'s The study "addressed questions and concerns
raised by the citizens of Libby regarding possible ongoing exposures to
5 Id6 id
7 Id. at 1138-39.8 Id. at 1139. After Grace discontinued operation of the plant it sold the majority of its
facilities and real estate holdings to Kootenai Development Corporation ("KDC"). Id.
KDC is a subsidiary of Grace and the court only refers to Grace throughout its opinion.
Id at 1139 n.1. See also, Brief of Appellant at 2, United States v. W.R. Grace & Co, et.
al, No. 03-35924 (9th Cir. April 26, 2004).
9 Grace II, 429 F.3d 1224, 1229 (9th Cir. 2005).
1'Id
12 Id. at 1230.
1 Id. at 1229. Prior to the nineties, studies had been conducted in Libby regarding
asbestos exposure. Id At the time, the studies mainly focused on exposure to asbestos in
the workplace. Id. However, prior to the actions that led to this case no CERCLA
activities were performed in Libby. Id.
14 Id. at 1225.
15 Id. at 1229. The EPA study focused on checking airborne asbestos levels and
gathering information on friable asbestos levels around the community. Id. The
information gathered in these two areas would allow the EPA to determine if it needed to
immediately intervene to protect the public health. Id.
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asbestos fibers as a result of historical mining, processing and exportation
of asbestos-containing vermiculite."1 6 The study showed that asbestos
contamination was pervasive.1 7
Based on its investigatory findings, the EPA concluded that a
removal action was necessary.' 8 The EPA determined that the asbestos
export and screening plants posed the greatest threat and should be
cleaned up first.' 9 This cleanup would cost approximately $5.8 million.2 0
The EPA later determined that cleanups were necessary at six other
locations and would cost $20.1 million. 21 In 2002, the EPA declared that it
would be necessary to further expand the scope of the cleanup to
residential homes and businesses in the community. 22 After the third
cleanup effort all future efforts were to be deemed remedial actions. 3 The
estimated cost for the cleanup in Libby totaled $55.6 million.24
In March 2001, the EPA filed suit against Grace seeking recovery
of cleanup costs and a declaration holding Grace liable for future cleanup
costs.25 In its defense, Grace argued that: 1) the EPA's actions were
16 Id. The study showed "(1) 'a large number of current and historic cases of asbestos
related diseases centered around Libby,' including '33 incidents of apparently non-
occupational exposures'; and (2) a 'high likelihood that significant amounts of asbestos
contaminated vermiculite still remained in and around Libby."' Id. at 1230.
17 Id. The EPA found that the asbestos problem in Libby was especially troubling
because the residents were surrounded by asbestos. Id. The residents were being
exposed to asbestos when they walked because foot traffic put asbestos in the air. Id
Additionally, the wind carried particles throughout the town, which made them easy to
inhale. Id. As further proof of the contamination, a study of the residents showed that
18% had lung abnormalities, compared to an expected rate of 0.2% to 2.3% in the United
States. Id
1 Id.
20 Id. This project should have been capped at $2 million. See 42 U.S.C. § 9604(c)(1)
(2000); 40 C.F.R. § 300.415(b)(5) (2005). However, under CERCLA, the EPA may
exceed this cap if it determines that an immediate threat is posed to the surrounding
community. 42 U.S.C. § 9604(c)(1).
21 Grace II, 429 F.3d at 1231. The EPA also determined that an exemption from the
monetary cap applied to the cleanup of these six sites. Id22 d
23 id
24 Id. At this time, the EPA also determined that continuing action in Libby would be
necessary to remedy the exposure problem. Id.
25 Grace I, 280 F. Supp. 2d 1135, 1140 (D. Mont. 2002).
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inconsistent with the actions required by the National Contingency Plan,
2) the EPA did not properly account for its costs, 3) the EPA's activities
covered areas where the asbestos containing material was naturally
occurring, and 4) the release of asbestos was an act of God and not the
fault of Grace.26 The United States filed a motion for summary judgment,
which the Montana District Court granted in part and denied in part. 2 ' The
district court determined that the substantial number of asbestos related
diseases and the amount of asbestos containing material in Libby
supported the EPA's contention that there was an imminent and
substantial threat to the residents.28 Thus, the EPA's classification of the
cleanup as a removal action was not arbitrary or capricious.29 The court
also stated that the EPA acted within its authority when it exceeded the $2
million statutory cap for removal actions because of the immediate risk
that the asbestos posed to the surrounding community. 30
The district court next focused on whether the United States could
recover its costs from Grace. 3 ' After the United States established a prima
facie case, Grace had to rebut the evidence by showing that the EPA did
not follow the National Contingency Plan ("NCP"). 32 At that time, Grace
stipulated that it was liable for cleanup costs at a majority of the properties
at issue.33 However, the court determined that there were issues of
26 d27 Id. at 1148. The United States actually filed three separate summary judgment
motions. Id. However, the court found three predominant themes throughout the
motions: 1) was the EPA's action arbitrary and capricious, 2) was Grace liable for the
cleanup costs under CERCLA, and 3) was the EPA entitled to receive compensation for
the $55 million spent to cleanup Libby? Id. at 1142.
28 Id. at 1142-43.
29 Id. at 1143. In order for the court to find the EPA's actions arbitrary and capricious, it
must find that the EPA was clearly erroneous when it discharged its duties under the
NCP. United States v. Ne. Pharm. & Chem. Co., Inc., 810 F.2d 726, 748 (8th Cir. 1986).
30 Grace 1, 280 F. Supp. 2d at 1144.
31 Id. In order to establish recovery the United States had to prove: "(1) the site was a
facility; (2) a release or threatened release of a hazardous substance occurred; (3) the
government incurred costs in responding to the release or threatened release; and (4) the
defendant was the liable party." Id.
32 Id The NCP "specifies procedures for preparing and responding to contaminations
and was promulgated by the [EPA] pursuant to CERCLA." Grace II, 429 F.3d 1224,
1227, 1227 n.3 (9th Cir. 2005).
3 Grace I, 280 F. Supp. 2d at 1145.
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material fact as to whether Grace was responsible for cleanup costs at the
remaining locations and thus denied the United States' motion for
summary judgment on this claim. 34
The district court next focused on Grace's liability for the costs of
the cleanup action.3 5 The court determined that if the EPA had failed to
follow the NCP, then Grace would not be liable for costs. 36 Because the
EPA had followed this plan, Grace was responsible for all of the cleanup
costs. 37 Therefore, if Grace was found liable for the cleanup costs at the
properties that remained in dispute, it would be responsible for the entire
cost of the cleanup.38 After determining these issues, the court held a three
day bench trial and found Grace liable for a total of $55 million in cleanup
costs. 39
Grace appealed the judgment to the Ninth Circuit.40 On appeal, the
Ninth Circuit reviewed the district court's grant of summary judgment
regarding the classification of the cleanup action as a removal.4 1 The Ninth
Circuit affirmed the district court's decision.42 The court found that the
classification was not arbitrary or capricious and that the administrative
record supported the classification. 43
34 id
3 1 d. at 1145-46.
36 Id. at 1146.
37 Id.38 id
3 Grace II, 429 F.3d 1224, 1232 (9th Cir. 2005).
40 id.
41 Id. at 1225.
42 Id. at 1227.
43 Id. at 1233.
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III. LEGAL BACKGROUND
Congress enacted CERCLA on December 11, 1980." CERCLA
was enacted in order "to provide for liability, compensation, cleanup, and
emergency response for hazardous substances released into the
environment and the cleanup of inactive hazardous waste disposal sites.'" 5
Congress recognized that many businesses were negligently, recklessly,
and improperly disposing of hazardous waste.4 6 Congress deemed this
problem the "Inactive Hazardous Waste Site Problem.'" 7 It determined
that there were between 30,000 and 50,000 inactive sites throughout the
county and between 1,200 and 2,000 of those posed a serious risk to
public health.48 Congress believed that because these sites posed such a
serious threat to public health, a statutory means of cleanup was
49necessary.
The act created a "hazardous waste response trust fund," which
imposed excise taxes on oil, feedstock, and specified inorganic
substances.50 The proceeds of this fund were earmarked for cleanup of
hazardous wastes that were threatening or causing harm to the public or
the environment.5 ' The imposition of the excise tax was slated to end in
1985; however, Congress extended CERCLA by enacting the Superfund
Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986.52 The act was again
amended by the Asset Conservation, Lender Liability, and Deposit
Insurance Protection Act of 1996 5 and again in 2002 by the Small
Business Liability Relief and Brownfields Revitalization Act. 54
" CERCLA, Pub. L. No. 96-510, 94 Stat. 2767 (1980).
4 94 Stat. at 2767.
46 H.R. REP. No. 96-1016(I), at 17 (1980).
47 H.R. Rep. No. 96-1016(I), at 17.
48 H.R. Rep. No. 96-1016(I), at 18.
49 H.R. Rep. No. 96-1016(I), at 25.
'0 H.R. REP. No. 96-1016(II), at 1 (1980).51 H.R. Rep. No. 96-1016(11), at 2.52 Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-499, § 1, 100
Stat. 1613.
5 Asset Conservation, Lender Liability, Deposit Insurance Protection Act of 1996, Pub.
L. No. 104-208, § 2501, 110 Stat. 3009, 3009-462.
$4 Small Business Liability Relief and Brownfields Revitalization Act, Pub. L. No. 107-
118, 115 Stat. 2356 (2002).
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When Congress enacted the CERCLA, it defined "removal" as the
cleanup of released hazardous substances into the environment and
included actions that would be necessary to prevent the release of
hazardous substances into the environment." Removal actions included,
but were not limited to, actions that were "necessary to monitor, assess,
and evaluate the release or threat of release of hazardous substances, the
disposal of removed material, or the taking of such other actions as may be
necessary to prevent, minimize, or mitigate damage to the public health or
welfare."56 Congress also defined remedial actions as those actions that
were consistent with a permanent remedy.5 7 The remedial actions were to
be taken in the event of a release or a threatened release of a hazardous
substance or to help minimize the threat to public health or welfare.5 8
Remedial actions could be taken in addition to removal actions.59
5s CERCLA, Pub. L. No. 96-510, 94 Stat. 2767 (1980).
The terms "remove" or "removal" means the cleanup or removal of
released hazardous substances from the environment, such actions as
may be necessary [sic] taken in the event of the threat of release of
hazardous substances into the environment, such actions as may be
necessary to monitor, assess, and evaluate the release or threat of
release of hazardous substances, the disposal of removed material, or
the taking of such other actions as may be necessary to prevent,
minimize, or mitigate damage to the public health or welfare or to the
environment, which may otherwise result from a release or threat of
release. The term includes, in addition, without being limited to,
security fencing or other measures to limit access, provision of
alternative water supplies, temporary evacuation and housing of
threatened individuals not otherwise provided for, action taken under
section 9604(b) of this title, and any emergency assistance which may
be provided under the Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act.
42 U.S.C. § 9601(23) (2000).
56 § 101, 94 Stat. at 2767. See 42 U.S.C. § 9601.
s7§ 101, 94 Stat. at 2767.
§ 101, 94 Stat. at 2767.
The term includes, but is not limited to, such actions at the location of
the release as storage, confinement, perimeter protection using dikes,
trenches, or ditches, clay cover, neutralization, cleanup of released
hazardous substances or contaminated materials, recycling or reuse,
diversion, destruction, segregation of reactive wastes, dredging or
excavations, repair or replacement of leaking containers, collection of
leachate and runoff, onsite treatment or incineration, provision of
245
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The definitions of removal and remedial actions remained
relatively unchanged by the amendments to CERCLA. Thus, the
interpretation of both removal and remedial has been left to the courts,
which have developed one major distinction between the two actions. The
major distinction between a removal and remedial action is whether there
is a need for an immediate action.6 0 When there is an immediate threat to
public health, a removal action is typically justified.6' Courts have further
tailored the definitions of removal and remedial actions. Courts have
found that a removal action is generally short term, while a remedial
action is long-term and permanent. 62
Courts have also focused on CERCLA's primary purpose to guide
them in their interpretation of the statute. Courts have stated that
CERCLA's primary purpose is cleaning up hazardous waste sites and,
alternative water supplies, and any monitoring reasonably required to
assure that such actions protect the public health and welfare and the
environment. The term includes the costs of permanent relocation of
residents and businesses and community facilities where the President
determines that, alone or in combination with other measures, such
relocation is more cost-effective than and environmentally preferable to
the transportation, storage, treatment, destruction, or secure disposition
offsite of hazardous substances, or may otherwise be necessary to
protect the public health or welfare.
42 U.S.C. § 9601(24).
' § 101, 94 Stat. 2767.
The terms "remedy" or "remedial action" means those actions
consistent with permanent remedy taken instead of or in addition to
removal actions in the event of a release or threatened release of a
hazardous substance into the environment, to prevent or minimize the
release of hazardous substances so that they do not migrate to cause
substantial danger to present or future public health or welfare or the
environment.
42 U.S.C. § 9601.
6o See City of Wichita v. Trs. Of APCO Oil Corp. Liquidating Trust, 306 F. Supp. 2d
1040, 1077-78 (D. Kan. 2003); Hatco Corp. v. W.R. Grace & Co.-Conn. 849 F.Supp.
931, 963 (D. N.J. 1994).
61 See Carson Harbor Vill., Ltd. v. Unocal Corp., 287 F. Supp. 2d 1118, 1157 (C.D. Cal.
2003) (action was remedial because there was no evidence of an immediate threat to
human health).
62See Prisco v. New York, 902 F. Supp. 374, 385-86 (S.D.N.Y. 1995); City of New York
v. Exxon Corp., 633 F. Supp. 609, 614 n.6 (S.D.N.Y. 1986).
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thus, should be construed liberally.6 3 Liberal construction is necessary in
order to ensure that the EPA is able to respond efficiently and promptly to
the hazardous waste site.M Additionally, broad interpretation allows the
government to hold the polluting party responsible for the costs of the
cleanup.65 Courts have stated that if the costs of the cleanup could not be
recouped, the Superfund would be depleted and taxpayers would have to
bear the financial burden of the cleanup, which defeats the purpose of
CERCLA.66
In United States v. Hardage,67 the court allowed a private party to
challenge the government's classification of cleanup. 68 The court stated,
"[A] defendant who is declared liable for future response costs may still
challenge those costs as unrecoverable because the underlying response
actions giving rise to the costs are inconsistent with the NCP."6 Other
cases have also held that where the government's costs are inconsistent
with the response plan, they should not be recoverable. 70 Therefore, the
NCP sets guidelines that limit the EPA in its ability to recover CERCLA
CtS71costs.
In Grace, the costs incurred would be inconsistent with the NCP if
the EPA incorrectly classified the action as a removal. Until Grace, no
court had tackled the distinction between removal and remedial actions.
Previous courts glossed over the definitions of removal and remedial,
while Grace dives deeper into the definitions in order to determine the
distinction between removal and remedial.
63 See United States v. Witco Corp., 865 F. Supp. 245, 247 (E.D. Penn. 1994); United
States v. Distler, 741 F. Supp. 637, 642 (W.D. Ky. 1990) (CERCLA is remedial in nature
and a court should not interpret it in any way that frustrates the goals of the statute).
6 Witco, 865 F. Supp. at 247.
65 d
6 Id. (citing B.F. Goodrich Co. v. Murtha, 958 F.2d 1192 (2d Cir. 1992); United States v.
Aceto Agric. Chems. Corp., 872 F.2d 1372, 177 (8th Cir. 1989); City of New York v.
Exxon Corp., 744 F. Supp. 474, 485 (S.D.N.Y. 1990)).
67 982 F.2d 1436 (10th Cir. 1992).6 1 d. at 1445.
69 id.
70 United States v. USX Corp., 68 F.3d 811, 817 (3d Cir. 1995) (stating that summary
judgment should not be granted because material issues of fact existed as to whether
certain expenses incurred by the EPA were reasonable).
n1 United States v. E.I. Dupont De Nemours & Co., 432 F.3d 161, 169 (3d Cir. 2005).
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IV. INSTANT DECISION
In the instant decision, the court of appeals addressed the issue of
whether the cleanup action was a removal action or a remedial action
under CERCLA.72 The characterization of the cleanup was at issue
because if deemed to be a remedial action, the EPA did not fulfill the
statutory requirements of the NCP." However, if the action was classified
as a removal action the EPA had broad discretion to tailor its response to
the presumed threat.74 Grace argued even if the cleanup was properly
classified as a removal action, it should not have been exempted from the
$2 million cap.
Grace argued that the EPA improperly characterized the action as a
removal action rather than a remedial action.76 Grace claimed that the
cleanup should have been characterized as a remedial action because it
would be ongoing and permanent." On the other hand, a removal action is
72 Grace II, 429 F.3d 1224, 1226 (9th Cir. 2005).
7 Id. The NCP requires the acting party to perform remedial actions in accordance with
42 U.S.C. § 9621. 42 U.S.C. § 9604(c)(4) (2000). The requirements for performing a
remedial action include an analysis of the costs and effectiveness of the remediation and
inclusion on the National Priority List. See 42 U.S.C. § 9621 and 40 C.F.R. §§
300.425(b)(1), 300.430 (e)(7) (2005). The court also stated that the distinction between
the two classifications was important because, "the requirements for remedial actions are
more detailed and onerous." Grace II, 429 F.3d at 1228.
74 Grace II, 429 F.3d at 1226.
7 Id. 40 C.F.R. § 300.415 provides in part:
CERCLA fund-financed removal actions, other than those authorized
under section 104(b) of CERCLA shall be terminated after $2 million
has been obligated for the action or 12 months have elapsed from the
date that removal activities begin on-site, unless the lead agency
determines that:
(i) There is an immediate risk to public health or welfare of the United
States or the environment; continued response actions are immediately
required to prevent, limit, or mitigate an emergency; and such
assistance will not otherwise be provided on a timely basis; or
(ii) Continued response action is otherwise appropriate and consistent
with the remedial action to be taken.
40 C.F.R. § 300.415(b)(5).
76 Grace II, 429 F.3d at 1226.
77Id. See supra notes 57-59 and accompanying text.
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a time-sensitive response to public health threats. 78 The basic premise of
Grace's argument stems from the EPA's erroneous classification and its
effect on the statutory requirements under the NCP.79 Had the EPA
correctly classified the actions as remedial, the EPA would not have met
all the statutory requirements and Grace would not be liable for all the
cleanup costs.
The court reasoned that the classification should stand because
CERCLA states that the selection of the response action should be upheld
unless it is arbitrary and capricious or not in accordance with the law. 8 To
determine if the EPA acted arbitrarily, a set of eight factors must be
considered.82 The court found that the EPA not only looked at the factors,
78 Grace II, at 1227-28.
9 Id. at 1226.
so Id. at 1229. "CERCLA provides that responsible parties shall be liable for 'all costs of
removal or remedial action incurred by the United States Government .. . not
inconsistent with the national contingency plan."' Id.
81 Id. at 1232.
82 Id. at 1234 n.15.
[T]he following factors shall be considered in determining the
appropriateness of a removal action:
(i) Actual or potential exposure to nearby human populations, animals,
or the food chain from hazardous substances or pollutants or
contaminants;
(ii) Actual or potential contamination of drinking water supplies or
sensitive ecosystems;
(iii) Hazardous substances or pollutants or contaminants in drums,
barrels, tanks, or other bulk storage containers, that may pose a threat
of release;
(iv) High levels of hazardous substances or pollutants or contaminants
in soils largely at or near the surface, that may migrate;
(v) Weather conditions that may cause hazardous substances or
pollutants or contaminants to migrate or be released;
(vi) Threat of fire or explosion;
(vii) The availability of other appropriate federal or state response
mechanisms to respond to the release; and
(viii) Other situations or factors that may pose threats to public health
or welfare of the United States or the environment.
40 C.F.R. § 300.415(b)(2) (2005).
249
Mo. ENVTL. L. & POL'Y REv., Vol. 14, No. 1
but the EPA's findings were extensively documented. Because the EPA
reviewed these factors and found that the threat was imminent and severe,
the EPA's decision to classify the cleanup as a removal action was not
arbitrary and capricious.84 However, the court concluded that the analysis
should also determine whether the EPA's actions were actually consistent
with those of a removal action.85
In determining the difference between removal and remedial
actions, the court needed to determine how much deference it should give
to the EPA's classification of the cleanup. 86 The court noted that agency
decisions normally receive deference under the standard detailed in
Chevron; however, the Supreme Court had recently refined the level of
deference an agency interpretation receives in Mead.8 The court was
"conflicted as to whether Chevron deference only appli[ed] upon formal
rulemaking and whether lesser deference applies in other situations."88
Unable to determine the appropriate standard to apply, the court analyzed
the facts under Chevron.8 9 However, the court declared that the end result
of the case would be the same even under the modified standard of
review. 90
The first step in the Chevron analysis required the court to look at
the legislative history of CERCLA. 91 The court first found that the
definitions for both removal and remedial were broad and somewhat
vague.92 In fact, the definitions for removal and remedial actions were so
8 Grace II, 429 F.3d at 1234. In the first study conducted by the EPA, five of the eight
factors were considered. Id. at 1234. The study found a substantial threat to human
health, that competing exposure pathways existed, and that the contamination could
readily migrate. Id.
Id. at 1232-33.
SId. at 1233.86 Id. at 1236. See also Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837
(1984); United States v. Mead Corp. 533 U.S. 218, 226-27 (2001).
87 Grace II, 429 F.3d at 1235. See also Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-45.
88 Grace II, 429 F.3d at 1235.
9 Id. at 1236.
9 Id.
' Id at 1237.
9 Id. at 1238.
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similar that they threatened to collapse into one another.93 Turning to other
rules of construction, the court found little help.94 The court stated that
neither taking the words as a whole nor viewing the purpose of the statute
provided any guidance as to the true meaning of removal or remedial.9 5
Additionally, the only reference the court could pull from the legislative
history was that Congress had an overarching concern for the public
welfare.96 Because of this, the court determined that they could not discern
the meanings of removal or remedial by using the normal rules of statutory
interpretation. 97
Since normal rules of interpretation did not apply, the court turned
to the EPA-promulgated NCP.98 The court found that the examples listed
by removal actions in this plan closely mirrored the activities that took
place in Libby.99 The court acknowledged that the characterization of the
cleanup as removal should not be overturned when the agency is faced
with interpreting a complex regulatory scheme. 00 When a regulation
scheme is complex, the court reasoned that because the agency
administrator is an expert in the area, the expert is in the best position to
9 Id. The court stated that the definition of removal and remedial almost collapse into
one because the triggering factors for each definition sound virtually similar to each
other. Id. Specifically, the court stated there was almost no difference between the
following statements: "such other actions as may be necessary to prevent, minimize, or
mitigate damage to the public health or welfare or to the environment, which may
otherwise result from a release or threat of release" and "those actions consistent with
permanent remedy taken to prevent or minimize the release of hazardous substances so
that they do not migrate to cause substantial danger to present or future public health or
welfare or the environment." Id.
94 Id. at 1239.
"Id. at 1239-40.
96 Id. at 1240-41.
97 id.
9 Id. The court turned to the NCP because it details the actions that are to be taken for
removal and remedial actions. 42 U.S.C. § 9604 (2000).
9 Grace II, 429 F.3d at 1242. Examples in the NCP provided for fencing of sites,
removal of highly contaminated material, and capping of soil to prevent migration. Id.
The activities in Libby consisted of removing hazardous materials and installing covers
over materials that were likely to migrate. Id.
' Id. at 1243.
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make a well-informed judgment.o'0 In making this determination, the court
also focused on the fact that an immediate response was needed to correct
the contamination in Libby.102 Previous internal memoranda to project
managers at the EPA stated that the key distinction between remedial
actions and removal actions was the "time sensitivity" of the issue. 103 In
Libby, an immediate response was needed because of the presence of
complete exposure pathways and the fact that the average Libby resident
was exposed to asbestos 24 hours a day.
Finding that the action was a removal, the court next focused on
whether the EPA properly exceeded the $2 million statutory cap.'0 5 The
court determined that the EPA could exceed the statutory cap if it found 1)
that continued response actions were immediately necessary to prevent an
emergency, 2) there was an immediate risk to public health, and 3) the
assistance would not otherwise be provided on a timely basis.106 The court
determined the EPA had properly met all three of these conditions. 0 7
Therefore, it was acceptable to exceed the $2 million cap for removal
actions.
V. COMMENT
When Congress drafted the removal and remedial provisions of
CERCLA, it should have known that it would create a guessing game for
courts. It is as if the provisions, "had been drafted by a weary
Congressional staffer in the wee hours - even the syntax is incorrect." 08
Even the Ninth Circuit stated that the definitions are so similar they
101 Id. In determining whether the actions of the EPA were correct the court focused on
four factors that courts have previously looked at: 1) whether the threat was time
sensitive, 2) the duration of the threat, 3) the permanence of the response, and 4) the
seriousness of the threat. Id. at 1244-45.
102 Id. at 1243-44, 1243 n.23.
103 Id. at 1244.
'4Id. at 1243.
os Id. at 1246-47.
0 Id at 1248. See 42 U.S.C. § 9604(c)(1) (2000).
107 Grace II, 429 F.3d at 1248-49.
0 8 Jerry L. Anderson, "Removal or Remedial? The Myth of Cercla's Two-Response
System," 18 COLUM. J. ENvTL. L. 103, 127 (1993).
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threaten to collapse into each other.109 Because of the similarity of the
definitions, courts traditionally have not second-guessed the EPA's initial
classification of the cleanup.11o In deciding Grace, the Ninth Circuit did
not second-guess the EPA's initial classification of the cleanup as a
removal."' However, the court did determine that it was necessary to look
beyond the EPA's classification to see if the EPA acted consistent with its
determination.112 The Ninth Circuit concluded the EPA's actions were
consistent with its classification; however, this determination was
incorrect.
In order to determine if the EPA's actions were consistent with its
classification, the court turned to the legislative history of CERCLA to
help it differentiate between a removal and a remedial action.H3 The court
then decided it would not look to committee reports that discussed
CERCLA because the reports did not address the version of CERCLA that
ultimately became law.114 By deciding not to look at any committee
reports, the court could simply skip to the next step in the analysis, which
was to decide whether to give the EPA's decision deference." 5 The court
determined that the EPA rationally construed the statute and the
determination deserved respect.116 By doing this, the court glossed over
the legislative history in order to reach the conclusion that it wanted. By
refusing to look at prior committee reports which might shed some light
on the removal and remedial distinction, the court was able move on to
agency deference. At this point, the court was able to wash its hands of the
issue by simply stating that the agency tried its best to construe the statute;
therefore, their decision should stand.
In determining not to take a close look at the legislative history, the
court ignored the fact that the legislature must have intended two distinct
categories of cleanups. When it drafted the statute, Congress had the
ability to make only one cleanup category or to state that the EPA's
109 Grace II, 429 F.3d at 1238.
' See Id. at 1239.
.Id. at 1234.
112 id.
13 Id. at 1238.
114 Id. at 1240.
' Id. at 1241.
"16 id.
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determination should not be reviewed. Congress did neither of these, so it
must have meant for there to be a distinction between a removal and a
remedial action. Congress surely did not intend for the EPA to be able to
use any ambiguity in the statute to bend companies into compliance.
The court's view also perpetuates the notion that the EPA should
be able to strong arm companies. The court relied solely on, "the drafter's
overarching concern for public health" to guide it in its interpretation." 7
This notion led the court to state that removal should be interpreted
liberally so CERCLA's goals will be accomplished." 8 Under this view, as
long as the EPA is cleaning up waste in order to protect the public, its
classification will be upheld. It is hard to imagine a situation where the
EPA will be acting arbitrarily when it classifies a site. As long as there is a
hazardous waste site nearby there will be a concern for public health.
Thus, the EPA's classification of a site will never be overturned.
The Ninth Circuit also inaccurately determined that the asbestos
posed an immediate threat to the residents of Libby.' 19 The court stated
that the threat was immediate because the EPA's study in 2000 found that
airborne asbestos exceeded the permissible asbestos exposure level.120
Additionally, the court noted that complete exposure pathways were
present in Libby.' 2 1
For asbestos to be dangerous it needs to be airborne and a person
needs to inhale the asbestos fibers for there to be any exposure risk.122
Because of this, the EPA has previously stated, "the mere presence of a
hazardous substance, such as asbestos on an auditorium ceiling, no more
implies that an asbestos-related disease will develop than a poisonous
substance in a medicine cabinet or under a kitchen sink implies that a
poisoning will occur."' 23 In the government's brief, it conceded that there
.. Id. at 1240.
1 Id. at 1241.
119 Id. at 1244. The four factors the court looks at are inmediacy of the threat, duration
of the cleanup, the permanence of the cleanup, and the seriousness of the threat. Id.
120 Id. at 1241.
121 id.
122 See Asbestos; Advisory to the Public, 56 Fed. Reg. 13,472 (Apr. 2, 1991).
123 id
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was no danger of asbestos exposure through the ambient air.124 As such,
the asbestos in Libby posed no threat to the residents.
Additionally, the tests conducted in Libby showed that the level of
airborne asbestos was within the range deemed acceptable by the EPA. 2 s
The acceptable range for a known carcinogen is between 1 in 10,000 and 1
in 1,000,000.126 The United States admits that only two of the areas in
Libby met this risk level. 127 If most of the locations within Libby were in
the acceptable range, an immediate danger could not have been present.
Additionally, the EPA's webpage for Libby states, "health affects [sic]
seen today are primarily related to past exposures to miners and their
families."l 28 If the health risk was the result of past exposures, then there
was not a present risk to the residents of Libby.
VI. CONCLUSION
The United States' recovery of its cleanup costs in Libby was in
error. By not reviewing any of the legislative history of CERCLA, the
court is granting EPA enormous power. The court is giving the EPA the
power to classify the cleanup in any manner that it chooses and effectively
shutting off review of the EPA's decision. As long as the EPA makes
some effort to look at a few factors, the court says the EPA's decision will
not be arbitrary and capricious and the EPA's decision will be upheld.
Accordingly, it will not matter whether the EPA deems the cleanup a
removal or remedial action; it will be able to recoup its costs.
Additionally, the court erred in simply accepting the EPA
determination that the asbestos posed an immediate threat to Libby's
124 Brief of Appellee at 34, United States v. W.R. Grace & Co., No. 03-35924 (9th Cir.
July 21, 2004).
125 In determining the appropriate course of action, the EPA should conduct numerous
tests. 40 C.F.R. § 300.430 (2005). The guidelines for the studies indicate the normal
exposure level for specific toxins. Id.
126 40 C.F.R. § 300.430(e)(2)(i)(A)(2).
127 Brief of Appellee, supra note 124, at 26. The brief is only able to demonstrate that
both the Export and Screening Plant were over the acceptable range. Id. The United
States indicates that the EPA was able to document scenarios that exceed the acceptable
exposure level; however, it is unable to provide any other specific examples. Id.
128 U.S. EPA, Region 8-Libby Asbestos,
http://www.epa.gov/region8/superfund/libby/index.html (last visited March 24, 2006).
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residents. Tests conducted showed that the asbestos level was within the
normally accepted range and the EPA even conceded that breathing the air
in Libby was not a problem. As such, immediate action was not necessary
to cleanup Libby and the EPA erred in classifying the site as a removal
action.
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